To Understand ... Can Informational Modelling Help?
- Speaker: Professor Igor Aleksander.
- Date: Tuesday, 16 June 2015 from 12:30
- Location: Room 151, Birkbeck Main Building
Recently, in discussions of mental states such as 'understanding', 'meaning' and 'thought', Galen Strawson, and Tim Bayne ) have argued that a new phenomenology (cognitive phenomenology) is needed to cover deficiencies present in classical phenomenology (e.g. Edmond Husserl). Others argue that there is no need to do this as classical ideas provide an adequate description. Philosophers engaged in this debate are loathed to introduce computational modelling , but I argue that such modelling leads to some clarity. In this discussion I review the philosophical nature of the dabate and then introduce informational models that have been used in the past to discuss classical phenomenology (see: Aleksander and Morton ... Aristiotle's Laptop WSPC, 2012) and show how such models apply to cognitive phenomenology.